

<p><b>Research Question/Aims:</b> This thesis aims to study another outcome in addition to deterrence failure and success: when a deterrence strategy is abandoned or supplemented with other policy tools such as reassurance ... It seeks to refine Payne and Gray's conceptualisation of 'reasonableness'.</p> <p><b>Argument:</b> 'Bounded rationality' best represents the Sino-American relationship in various deterrence encounters ... [There are] three types of 'reasonableness' which entail 'knowledge', 'appreciation' and 'empathy'.</p>			
<p><b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b></p> <p><i>Hook</i></p> <p>Importance of deterrence theory</p> <p><i>Background/context</i></p> <p>Scope of argument</p> <p><i>Gap/significance</i></p> <p>Deterrence rationality and reasonableness</p> <p><i>Argument</i></p> <p>Outline of argument and methodology</p> <p><i>Signposting</i></p> <p>Chapter overview</p>	<p><b>Chapter 2</b></p> <p><b>Perceptions of irrationality: A historical perspective</b></p> <p>Broad purpose: Examines the perceptions held by the US with regard to its enemies in the late 20th Century.</p> <p>Argument: Such perceptions of potential adversaries are important as they support the convenient assumption that they are less likely to be deterred, or that they are even undeterrable.</p>	<p><b>Chapter 3: A typology of deterrence situations</b></p> <p>Broad purpose: Examines and extends Payne and Gray's concept of rational-but-unreasonable actors.</p> <p>Argument: The occurrence of irrationality, though possible, is rare in the international system.</p>	<p><b>Chapter 4: The three-step reasonableness matrix</b></p> <p>Broad purpose: Develops three different types of 'reasonableness' – 'unrecognised unreasonableness', 'recognised unreasonableness' and 'recognised reasonableness' – and their resultant impacts.</p> <p>Argument: The literature on strategic surprise, intelligence and deterrence theory help to draw parallels between surprise and deterrence failure. It also helps to flesh out an opponent's 'conceptual framework', and develops the concepts of knowledge, appreciation and empathy.</p>
	Section: Conflation of 'unreasonableness' and 'reason'	Section: Types of rationality	Section: Surprises and deterrence failure: some parallels
	Section: Perceptions of 'unreasonableness' and 'irrationality'	Section: Reasonableness	Section: Refining Payne's concept of reasonableness
	Section: Changes in American strategy	Section: Friction	Section: A new definition of reasonableness
		Section: The interaction of rationality, reasonableness and friction	Section: Learning and adaptation

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<p><b>Chapter 5: Case study 1 – Deterrence failures in the Korean War, 1950</b></p> <p>Broad purpose: Examines how the American deterrence attempt during the Korean War was an instance of 'unrecognised unreasonableness'</p> <p>Argument: The 1950 Korean war represents the strongest case for deterrence failure in the Sino-American relationship... China's concurrent attempt to deter the Americans from crossing the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel was a 'poor fit' to our model of 'recognised unreasonableness'.</p>	<p><b>Chapter 6: Case study 2 – Deterrence choices in the Vietnam War, 1964–1968</b></p> <p>Broad purpose: To show how the Vietnam War represents the clearest example of how the US and China finessed their deterrence strategies based on a stronger appreciation of their knowledge about their opponent's goals.</p> <p>Argument: The Sino-American confrontation in Vietnam represented an instance of 'recognised unreasonableness'.</p>	<p><b>Chapter 7: Case study 3 – The Sino-US confrontation over the Taiwan Strait, 1995–1996</b></p> <p>Broad purpose: To illustrate how coercive strategies were successful in the Sino-American relationship during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis</p> <p>Argument: Both China and the US possessed two components necessary for successful deterrence – 'appreciation' and 'empathy'.</p>	<p><b>Conclusion</b></p> <p>Summary of argument: Lessons for deterrence</p> <p>Types of reasonableness: Theory and practice in US policy</p> <p><i>Final word:</i> Deterrence: The way forward</p>
Section: Background of the Sino-American relationship	Section: Background of the Sino-American relationship: The 1950s	Section: Background to the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis: 1970s to early 1990s	
Section: Deterrence failures in the 1950 Korean War	Section: The Vietnam War, 1964–1968	Section: Taiwan Strait crisis, 1995–96	
Section: China's deterrence failures: Not a 'pure' case of recognised unreasonableness	Section: America's decision not to deter China	American deterrence of China: 'Recognised reasonableness'	
Section: Learning and adaptation	Section: China's deterrence of the US	Section: China's coercive diplomacy: 'Recognised reasonableness'	
	Section: Learning and adaptation	Section: Empathy	
		Section: Learning and adaptation	